Between Giuseppe Peano and Camillo Berneri, a foremost protagonist of the Italian anarchist movement, an interesting correspondence was exchanged in the years 1925-1929. Along with a presentation of the correspondence, Peano's political attitude and the role of his international language projects in early 20th century Italian left are discussed.

The main accounts of the documentary in contemporary analytic aesthetics have difficulties in dealing with the distinction between documentaries and docudramas. On the one hand, the assertion-based accounts proposed by Carroll, Ponech and Plantinga cannot properly differentiate documentaries from docudramas. On the other hand, Currie’s account can do so by relying on the notion of trace but this involves an undesirable side-effect, namely, the exclusion, from the documentary, of those documentaries that do not include traces of their subjects, as for (...) instance documentaries that resort to reenactments. Is there a way to exclude docudramas from the documentary without also excluding other films that we usually treat as documentaries? The paper affirmatively answers to this question by relying on the notion perceptual belief, that is, a belief that one can form by endorsing one's perception. Documentaries are defined as films that mandate us to form perceptual beliefs. Even if a docudrama mandates us to form beliefs, it does not mandate us to form perceptual beliefs, and thus does not count as a documentary. By contrast, a documentary that resorts to reenactments still mandates us to form perceptual beliefs and thus properly satisfies the definition proposed. (shrink)

Current health care standards, in many countries, Australia included, are regrettably poor. Surprisingly, practitioners and treating teams alike in mental health and disability sectors, in particular, make far too many basic care-related mistakes, in addition to the already abundant diagnostic mistakes that cause and amplify great harm. In part, too many practitioners also fail to distinguish adverse effects for what they are and all too often treat adverse effects, instead, as comorbidities. Diagnostic failures are dangerous, the result of which generates (...) and perpetuates harms that are extremely costly in terms of patient welfare, in addition to the financial burden placed on everyone. In this essay, I contend that the authority bestowed upon psychiatry is misplaced. Subsequently, this misplaced authority affects the governing and investigatory institutions reliant and informed by psychiatry. The examination process undertaken in this investigation traces the metaphysics of psychiatric disorders relative to the Diagnostic-Statistical-Manual (DSM) in all its iterations and to the epistemological construction process that serves to underpin the fundamentals of psychiatric practice. There exists a crisis of confidence in psychiatric practice and I urge drastic reform be undertaken to arrest the damage. (shrink)

This paper develops Richard Wollheim’s claim that the proper appreciation of a picture involves not only enjoying a seeing-in experience but also abiding by a standard of correctness. While scholars have so far focused on what fixes the standard, thereby discussing the alternative between intentions and causal mechanisms, the paper focuses on what the standard does, that is, establishing which kinds, individuals, features and standpoints are relevant to the understanding of pictures. It is argued that, while standards concerning kinds, individuals (...) and features can be relevant also to ordinary perception, standards concerning standpoints are specific to pictorial experience. Drawing on all this, the paper proposes an ontology of depiction according to which a picture is constituted by both its visual appearance and its standard of correctness. (shrink)

Vanity and pride have been condemned by Christian thinkers for centuries. Therefore, it may seem curious that Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d’Holbach, one of the fiercest critics of religion, decried these passions. Holbach’s work is interspersed with remarks about vanity and pride which have gone unnoticed in the literature. This chapter analyzes Holbach’s account of vanity, delving into the role it plays in the establishment and maintenance of religion. I show that the desire for prestige is at the very core of (...) religious practices, which aim to justify the alleged superiority of man over nature. Holbach’s well-known critique of religion, therefore, cannot be fully understood without reference to his lesser known account of vanity and pride. The study of these passions is also essential to grasping Holbach’s conception of philosophy and how the philosophe should be: an individual free from prejudices, who has abandoned every trace of vanity in order to move forward in their journey towards the truth. (shrink)

Over the past two decades, virtue ethicists have begun to devote increasing attention to applied ethics. In particular, the application of virtue ethical frameworks to the environmental ethics debate has flourished. This chapter reviews recent contributions to the literature in this field and highlights some strengths and weaknesses of thinking about climate change through a virtue ethical lens. Section “Two Benefits of Virtue Ethical Approaches to Climate Change” explores two benefits of applying virtue ethics to climate change: (a) we can (...) better capture the phenomenology of our moral experience, and (b) we avoid the problem of inconsequentialism. Section “A Catalogue of Environmental Virtues” analyzes various practical proposals that have been put forward in the form of specific environmental virtues. Section “An Objection to Virtue-Oriented Approaches to Climate Change” reconstructs a fundamental objection to the idea of using a virtue ethical normative approach to tackling the urgent and imminent dangers of climate change. (shrink)

Both perception and imagination seem to play a crucial role in our engagement with fiction films but whether they really do so, and which role they possibly play, is controversial. On the one hand, a fiction film, as film, is a depiction that invites us to perceive the events portrayed. On the other hand, as fiction, it invites us to imagine the story told. Thus, after watching the film Alien, one might say that one saw Ripley fighting the monster but (...) one might also say that one imagined Ripley fighting the monster. Are these two reports compatible? If they are, how can we combine them so to make sense of them? If, instead, they are not, which of them should we give up? (shrink)

This paper considers two issues raised by the claim that fictional characters are abstract artifacts. First, given that artifacts normally have functions, what is the function of a fictional character? Second, given that, in experiencing works of fictions, we usually treat fictional characters as concrete individuals, how can such a phenomenology fit with an ontology according to which fictional characters are abstract artifacts? I will indirectly address the second issue by directly addressing the first one. For this purpose, I will (...) rely on the notion of a mental file. I will argue that the function of fictional characters is the generation of mental files of a special kind. I will show that our experience of fictional characters as concrete individuals depends on the kind of mental files that are generated by fictional characters as abstract artifacts. I will conclude that an appreciator of a work of fiction can open two files about a certain fictional character; one about the character as an individual in the fictional world, and the other about the character as an abstract artifact in the actual world. In this sense, our relation to a fictional character is characterized by a duality of files or ‘twofileness’. (shrink)

We obtain that Universe space has to be flat, but also, at the same time, it has to be finite, homogeneous (on global scale) and isotropic. So rays of light can be observed moving along parallel trajectories in an expanding finite hypersphere. We show this implies an accelerated expansion of the Universe. Considering the energy conservation problem, also we argue about the necessity of matter-antimatter asymmetry.

This paper considers two different kinds of philosophical interpretations of the movie Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind. On the one hand, Eternal Sunshine as a thought experiment that can function as an argument against utilitarianism. On the other hand, Eternal Sunshine as an instance of the genre of the remarriage comedy. I will argue that these two kinds of interpretations are in conflict. More specifically, Eternal Sunshine, understood as a comedy of remarriage, cannot function as an argument against utilitarianism, (...) at least in the sense specified by Grau and Wartenberg. Finally, I will suggest a different way in which Eternal Sunshine, understood as a comedy of remarriage, might function as an argument against utilitarianism. (shrink)

The observation that a crisis of confidence regarding Psychiatry exists is a notion shared even among psychiatrists themselves. Psychiatry has a checkered history and its alliance with the pharmaceutical industry, aka Big-Pharma, continues to reinforce a need for healthy skepticism. Why? Mainly, an over-reliance on the questionable expertise and authority afforded psychiatry as the specialists of mental health. I contend that the authority of psychiatry is misplaced and too often harmful. Since the criteria required to justify and satisfy psychiatric expertise (...) is not fully established as can be substantiated by compelling reasons to rethink its authority as a reliable profession in its current form. Psychiatric expertise is not particularly scientific and this is especially dangerous in a sector that prescribes mind-altering drugs. There are a number of identified criteria that would otherwise substantiate psychiatric expertise and whilst partially existent, are nonetheless deficient. These major yet deficient aspects of psychiatric practice concern diagnostic problems – reliability and verification of diagnoses and accurate testable validity of diagnoses - mainly due to an absence of identifiable underlying biomarkers ordinarily related to disease or biological conditions. Psychiatrists often fail to distinguish between reactive-depression (reaction to external event or circumstance) and endogenous-depression (biological) resulting, in part, from incorrectly distinguishing between conditions constitutive of ‘trait’ (endogenous) and of those of ‘state’ (e.g. reactive depression; adverse effects from medication, etc.). (shrink)

This paper explores some phenomenological consequences of the ontological affinity between films and pop songs. Given the central place of the recording technology in both films and pop songs, one can wonder whether pop songs can elicit from their listeners the same kind of experience that films elicit from their spectators. In other words, one can wonder whether pop songs encourage us to play a ‘game of make-believe’ analogous to that we play when we engage with films. The main part (...) of the paper is meant to provide a positive answer to this question. The remaining sections illustrate and test the proposed account by contrasting paradigmatic pop songs with borderline cases. (shrink)

Artefacts do not always do what they are supposed to, due to a variety of reasons, including manufacturing problems, poor maintenance, and normal wear-and-tear. Since software is an artefact, it should be subject to malfunctioning in the same sense in which other artefacts can malfunction. Yet, whether software is on a par with other artefacts when it comes to malfunctioning crucially depends on the abstraction used in the analysis. We distinguish between “negative” and “positive” notions of malfunction. A negative malfunction, (...) or dysfunction, occurs when an artefact token either does not or cannot do what it is supposed to. A positive malfunction, or misfunction, occurs when an artefact token may do what is supposed to but, at least occasionally, it also yields some unintended and undesirable effects. We argue that software, understood as type, may misfunction in some limited sense, but cannot dysfunction. Accordingly, one should distinguish software from other technical artefacts, in view of their design that makes dysfunction impossible for the former, while possible for the latter. (shrink)

The moving spotlight account (MS) is a view that combines an eternalist ontology and an A-theoretic metaphysics. The intuition underlying MS is that the present time is somehow privileged and experientially vivid, as if it were illuminated by a moving spotlight. According to MS-theorists, a key reason to prefer MS to B-theoretic eternalism is that our experience of time supports it. We argue that this is false. To this end, we formulate a new family of positions in the philosophy of (...) time, which differ from MS in that, intuitively, they admit a plurality of moving spotlights. We argue that these ‘deviant’ variants of MS cannot be dismissed as conceptually incoherent, and that they are as well-supported by our experience as is MS. One of these variants, however, is consistent with the B-theory. Thus, if our experience of time supports MS, then it supports the B-theory as well. (shrink)

In this article we will try to present a picture of what was the Stoic position on time; we will show the background ontology of the Stoics and in particular their idea of continuity. Through the theme of the continuum we will see the Stoic conception of the temporal instant and how they tried to answer Aristotle's aporias on time.

Conceptualism is the thesis that, for any perceptual experience E, (i) E has a Fregean proposition as its content and (ii) a subject of E must possess a concept for each item represented by E. We advance a framework within which conceptualism may be defended against its most serious objections (e.g., Richard Heck's argument from nonveridical experience). The framework is of independent interest for the philosophy of mind and epistemology given its implications for debates regarding transparency, relationalism and representationalism, demonstrative (...) thought, phenomenal character, and the speckled hen objection to modest foundationalism. (shrink)

This paper explores taste fragmentalism, a novel approach to matters of taste and faultless disagreement. The view is inspired by Kit Fine’s fragmentalism about time, according to which the temporal dimension can be constituted—in an absolute manner—by states that are pairwise incompatible, provided that they do not obtain together. In the present paper, we will apply this metaphysical framework to taste states. In our proposal, two incompatible taste states (such as the state of rhubarb’s being tasty and the state of (...) rhubarb’s being distasteful) can both constitute reality in an absolute manner, although no agent can have joint access to both states. We will then develop a formalised version of our view by means of an exact truthmaker semantics for taste assertions. Within this framework—we argue—our linguistic and inferential practices concerning cases of faultless disagreement are elegantly vindicated, thus suggesting that taste fragmentalism is worth of further consideration. (shrink)

Nel presente contributo è nostra intenzione sondare un binomio che appare fondamentale in funzione dialogica interculturale e interreligiosa, ossia la relazione tra logos e mythos, principalmente in vista dell’incontro tra cristianesimo e tradizione induista. È nostra convinzione che le forme complementari di «teo-logia» e «teo-mythia» possa essere esplorato con frutto, tanto in funzione specifica dell’incontro con la tradizione induista, quanto per una più ampia e profonda inculturazione del vangelo.

There is wide support in logic, philosophy, and psychology for the hypothesis that the probability of the indicative conditional of natural language, $P(\textit{if } A \textit{ then } B)$, is the conditional probability of $B$ given $A$, $P(B|A)$. We identify a conditional which is such that $P(\textit{if } A \textit{ then } B)= P(B|A)$ with de Finetti's conditional event, $B|A$. An objection to making this identification in the past was that it appeared unclear how to form compounds and iterations of (...) conditional events. In this paper, we illustrate how to overcome this objection with a probabilistic analysis, based on coherence, of these compounds and iterations. We interpret the compounds and iterations as conditional random quantities which, given some logical dependencies, may reduce to conditional events. We show how the inference to $B|A$ from $A$ and $B$ can be extended to compounds and iterations of both conditional events and biconditional events. Moreover, we determine the respective uncertainty propagation rules. Finally, we make some comments on extending our analysis to counterfactuals. (shrink)

This Research Topic aimed at deepening our understanding of the levels and explanations that are of interest for cognitive sci- entists, neuroscientists, psychologists, behavioral scientists, and philosophers of science. Indeed, contemporary developments in neuroscience and psy- chology suggest that scientists are likely to deal with a multiplicity of levels, where each of the different levels entails laws of behavior appropriate to that level (Berntson et al., 2012). Also, gathering and modeling data at the different levels of analysis is not suffi- (...) cient: the integration of information across levels of analysis is a crucial issue. Given such state of affairs, a number of interesting questions arise. How can the autonomy of explanatory levels be properly understood in behavioral explanation? Is reductionism a satis- factory strategy? How can high-level and low-level models be constrained in order to be actually explanatory of both behav- ioral and neurological or molecular evidence? What is the kind of relationship between those models? (shrink)

Nelson Goodman notoriously distinguished between autographic works, whose instances should be identified by taking history of production into account, and allographic works, whose instances can be identified independently of history of production. Scholars such as Jerrold Levinson, Flint Schier, and Gregory Currie have criticized Goodman’s autographic/allographic distinction arguing that all works are such that their instances should be identified by taking history of production into account. I will address this objection by exploiting David Davies’ distinction between e-instances and p-instances of (...) a work, thereby restating the autographic/allographic distinction. Then, I will show that this way of restating this distinction leads us to effective accounts of relevant related phenomena such as forgery, plagiarism, and digital technologies. Finally, I will show the theoretical advantages of my account of the autographic/allographic distinction in comparison with an alternative account recently proposed by Jason D’Cruz and P.D. Magnus. (shrink)

The paper considers sentences in which “now” occurs in initial position and shows that the meaning they convey differs from the meaning of sentences that are otherwise identical except for “now” occurring in final position. We argue that the occurrence of “now” in initial position triggers a particular kind of modal reading for the sentence to which the adverb is prefixed. A general notion of modal forcing is proposed to provide a uniform account of this kind of reading. Armed with (...) this account, we offer a solution to two tense-modal puzzles, which have to do with fatalism and the possibility of a changing past. (shrink)

This paper considers the practical question of why people do not behave in the way they ought to behave. This question is a practical one, reaching both into the normative and descriptive domains of morality. That is, it concerns moral norms as well as empirical facts. We argue that two main problems usually keep us form acting and judging in a morally decent way: firstly, we make mistakes in moral reasoning. Secondly, even when we know how to act and judge, (...) we still fail to meet the requirements due to personal weaknesses. This discussion naturally leads us to another question: can we narrow the gap between what people are morally required to do and what they actually do? We discuss findings from neuroscience, economics, and psychology, considering how we might bring our moral behavior better in line with moral theory. Potentially fruitful means include nudging, training, pharmacological enhancement, and brain stimulation. We conclude by raising the question of whether such methods could and should be implemented. (shrink)

The article presents the various phases in which one of the most eminent journals of the history of philosophy, the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (1888–), dealt with Leibniz’s philosophy and his intellectual legacy. In particular, this study compares the main moments of historiographical interest and disinterest for this subject to the specific attitudes of the journal during the long 20th century.

Pride is a fundamental element in Hume's description of human nature. An important part of the secondary literature on Hume is devoted to this passion. However, no one, as far as I am aware, takes seriously the fact that pride often appears in pairs with vanity. In Book 2 of the Treatise, pride is defined as the passion one feels when society recognizes his connection to a ‘cause’, composed by a ‘subject’ and a (positive) ‘quality’. Conversely, no definition of vanity (...) is provided. Despite Hume's fluctuating vocabulary, I hold that a conceptual difference between pride and vanity exists. To support this claim, I analyse the common features of these two passions, showing that both pride and vanity (a) are indirect passions, (b) are self-regarding passions, and (c) have the same structure. Supported by textual evidence, I then claim that vanity is a desire of reputation, a desire to feel pride, when pride is not (yet) in place, because its cause is only imaginary and not real. Nonetheless, I underscore that, at times, ‘vanity’ means simply pride and call for greater attention on this ongoing oscillation. In conclusion, I explore the implications of this account of vanity for social interactions in Hume's philosophy, which illustrates its intrinsic ambivalence. (shrink)

Symmetries play a major role in physics, in particular since the work by E. Noether and H. Weyl in the first half of last century. Herein, we briefly review their role by recalling how symmetry changes allow to conceptually move from classical to relativistic and quantum physics. We then introduce our ongoing theoretical analysis in biology and show that symmetries play a radically different role in this discipline, when compared to those in current physics. By this comparison, we stress that (...) symmetries must be understood in relation to conservation and stability properties, as represented in the theories. We posit that the dynamics of biological organisms, in their various levels of organization, are not just processes, but permanent (extended, in our terminology) critical transitions and, thus, symmetry changes. Within the limits of a relative structural stability (or interval of viability), variability is at the core of these transitions. (shrink)

Taking into account some basic epistemological considerations on psychoanalysis by Ignacio Matte Blanco, it is possible to deduce some first simple remarks on certain logical aspects of schizophrenic reasoning. Further remarks on mathematical thought are also made in the light of what established, taking into account the comparison with the schizophrenia pattern.

This article proposes an abstract mathematical frame for describing some features of cognitive and biological time. We focus here on the so called “extended present” as a result of protentional and retentional activities (memory and anticipation). Memory, as retention, is treated in some physical theories (relaxation phenomena, which will inspire our approach), while protention (or anticipation) seems outside the scope of physics. We then suggest a simple functional representation of biological protention. This allows us to introduce the abstract notion of (...) “biological inertia”. (shrink)

During the 19th and the 20th century the concept of system undergoes significant transformations. The interplay of biology and sociology gives rise to an olistic definition of the concept, in order to understand society by means of schemes developed in the field of theoris of organisms. It is possible to follow this development from Pareto and Henderson, to Parsons, and finally to Luhmann, by examining the various biological models to which they refer.

This is the first of a two-part paper in which I would like to propose some possible hypotheses on the early origins of symbolic function, which is the most typical feature of human being, based on disavowal mechanism. Briefly recalling the main stages of the history of symbolism, it will be possible to lay out many of its theories within the framework that we wish to outline with this work, this first part of which is mainly concerned with the basic (...) psychodynamic notion of disavowal and its possible applications, above all in regard to fetishism. (shrink)

The physical singularity of life phenomena is analyzed by means of comparison with the driving concepts of theories of the inert. We outline conceptual analogies, transferals of methodologies and theoretical instruments between physics and biology, in addition to indicating significant differences and sometimes logical dualities. In order to make biological phenomenalities intelligible, we introduce theoretical extensions to certain physical theories. In this synthetic paper, we summarize and propose a unified conceptual framework for the main conclusions drawn from work spanning a (...) book and several articles, quoted throughout. (shrink)

To avoid the mystical rapture that seizes interpreters put before the theme of unitas oppositorum in Cusanus and Leibniz, this contribution shall move from the prosaic question: what does ensue from such opposites or from their conjunction? 2) interweave the analysis with some external point of view, notably that of Erasmus. This question will be investigated on the background of two antitethical traditions in dealing philosophically with opposition and contradiction, although in the end we shall try and find out other (...) ways and reasons for connecting the two thinkers on the ground of the various possible unitates oppositorum, than those of the metaphysical doctrine of the opposites. (shrink)

Ludovico Geymonat was the most important philosopher of science in 20th-century Italy, but he also engaged in the Liberation War and in political activity. Here the first part of his career, when his activity was mostly based in Turin, is aketched, and an overall balance is suggested.

This paper explores mutable futurism, the view according to which the future can literally change—that is, it can happen that a future time t changes from containing an event E to lacking it. Mutable futurism has received little attention so far, and the details and implications of the view are underexplored in the literature. For instance, it currently lacks a precise metaphysical model and a formal semantics. Although we do not endorse mutable futurism, our goal here is to strengthen the (...) case for mutable futurism and help establish it as a worthy contender in the debate on the philosophy of time. To attain this goal, we try to make mutable futurism, along with its metaphysical and inferential commitments, as clear as possible, by providing it with a coherent metaphysical model and a plausible semantics, and we show that it can be backed by theoretical reasons. (shrink)

In this paper, I reconstruct Hume's account of decency, the virtue associated with a limited display of pride, and show how it presents a significant challenge to standard virtue ethical interpretations of Hume. In section I, I explore his ambivalent conception of pride as both virtuous (because useful and agreeable to oneself) and vicious (when excessive and disagreeable to others). In section II, I show how the virtue of decency provides a practical solution to these two clashing aspects of pride. (...) In doing so, I demonstrate that decency is a merely behavioural virtue that requires no virtuous motive and consists of nothing more than "a fair outside." I argue that this account of decency represents a serious and underexplored challenge to standard interpretations of Hume as a virtue ethicist committed to the idea that actions derive their moral value from underlying motives. In section III, I reply to some objections. -/- . (shrink)

Leibniz participates in a quite important thought tradition of christian Europe, that of concordia between Christians, or between religions. With him this heritage is universalised: the globalization of concordia gives birth to Leibniz’s harmony of universal truth, that the whole of humankind can access.

Science urges philosophy to be more empirical and philosophy urges science to be more reflective. This markedly occurred along the “discovery of the artificial” (CORDESCHI 2002): in the early days of Cybernetics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) researchers aimed at making machines more cognizant while setting up a framework to better understand human intelligence. By and large, those genuine goals still hold today, whereas AI has become more concerned with specific aspects of intelligence, such as (machine) learning, reasoning, vision, and action. (...) As a matter of fact, the field suffers from a chasm between two formerly integrated aspects. One is the engineering endeavour involving the development of tools, e.g., autonomous systems for driving cars as well as software for semantic information retrieval. The other is the philosophical debate that tries to answer questions concerning the nature of intelligence. Bridging these two levels can indeed be crucial in developing a deeper understanding of minds. An opportunity might be offered by the cogent theme of emotions. Traditionally, computer science, psychological and philosophical research have been compelled to investigate mental processes that do not involve mood, emotions and feelings, in spite of Simon’s early caveat (SIMON 1967) that a general theory of cognition must incorporate the influences of emotion. Given recent neurobiological findings and technological advances, the time is ripe to seriously weigh this promising, albeit controversial, opportunity. (shrink)

While there has been increased attention to emotions and institutions, the role of denial and repression of emotions has been overlooked. We argue that not only the expression and the feeling of emotions, but also their control through denial contribute to stabilize institutional orders. The role denial plays is that of avoiding the emergence of disruptive emotions that might motivate a challenge to the status quo. Reflecting on the example of the livestock industry, we propose a theoretical model that identifies (...) seeds for change in denied emotional contradictions in an inte- gration of the cultural-relational and issue-based conceptions of organi- zational fields. (shrink)

I discuss Enrico Berti “Saggezza o filosofia pratica?” published in the current issue of “Ethics & Politics”. I argue that Kant’s normative ethics was in fact a kind of virtue ethics and most of the opposition between Aristotelianism and Kantian ethics in the last three decades has been basically an exercise in cross-purpose.

The verb ‘to know’ can be used both in ascriptions of propositional knowledge and ascriptions of knowledge of acquaintance. In the formal epistemology literature, the former use of ‘know’ has attracted considerable attention, while the latter is typically regarded as derivative. This attitude may be unsatisfactory for those philosophers who, like Russell, are not willing to think of knowledge of acquaintance as a subsidiary or dependent kind of knowledge. In this paper we outline a logic of knowledge of acquaintance in (...) which ascriptions like ‘Mary knows Smith’ are regarded as formally interesting in their own right, remaining neutral on their relation to ascriptions of propositional knowledge. The resulting logical framework, which is based on Hintikka’s modal approach to epistemic logic, provides a fresh perspective on various issues and notions at play in the philosophical debate on acquaintance. (shrink)

Anger is arguably one of the most important emotions in a human being’s life. An array of contemporary studies show that, far from being detrimental, anger can foster one’s self-esteem, improve their social interactions, and even benefit physical and mental health. In his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume explicitly recognized the importance of anger. And yet, few topics have been so neglected in the Hume scholarship as his account of this passion. The following chapter aims to fill the gap (...) in the literature by showing that Hume’s analysis of anger is worth studying and strictly connected to some of the most intriguing problems in his philosophy. (shrink)

It is well known that Peano had a reluctant attitude towards philosophy, including philosophy of mathematics. Some scholars have suggested the existence of an 'implicit' philosophy, without being able to describe it. In this paper a first attempt is done to reconstruct, if not a general philosophy of mathematics, at least Peano' epistemology of mathematics and its relation to contemporary positions.

The paper (an ample reworking of a 2005 Italian paper) tries to evaluate Leibniz’s enduring fascination with Spinoza and presents an overview in five stages of the development of his complex relationship to his thought, beginning with the time of Mainz, when Leibniz shows a strange urgency to get in epistolary contact with the author of the Theologico-Political Treatise, despite his public rejection of both the work and the author; then Leibniz’s stay in Paris, especially in the year 1675, when (...) he seeks information through Tschirnhaus on Spinoza’s clandestine doctrines; their personal meeting in the Hague, towards the end of the year 1676, and the subsequent distancing of Leibniz from Spinozism; the reading by Leibniz of Spinoza’s Opera Posthuma and the extension of his arguments against Spinozism to discredit Cartesian philosophy in general, and, finally, Leibniz’s retrospective evaluation of Spinoza’s thought in the Theodicy. (shrink)

A series of recent experimental studies have cast doubt on the existence of a traditional tension that aestheticians have noted in our aesthetic judgments and practices, viz. the problem of taste. The existence of the problem has been acknowledged since Hume and Kant, though not enough has been done to analyse it in depth. In this paper, we remedy this by proposing six possible conceptualizations of it. Drawing on our analysis of the problem of taste, we argue that the experimental (...) results in question are not a real challenge to its existence. By contrast, they provide empirical evidence in its support. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new dialetheic logic, a Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions ), including classical logic as a particular case. In \, exclusivity is expressed via the speech acts of assuming and concluding. In the paper we adopt the semantics of the logic of paradox extended with a generalized notion of model and we modify its proof theory by refining the notions of assumption and conclusion. The paper starts with an explanation of the adopted philosophical perspective, then (...) we propose our \ logic. Finally, we show how \ supports the dialetheic solution of the liar paradox. (shrink)

The paper discusses problems related to historical change in the field of technology applied to the preservation and communication of knowledge. Debates of the years 1990s about the possible decadence of (printed) books in favour of other technologies, are evaluated with the help of a historical analogy. The art of memory was a widespread non-material technique for managing information in a world of prevalent oral communication, which was set aside by the new technologies of printed communication. In the first part, (...) the Author discusses the final phase in the history of the art of memory, sketching Lambert Schenckel’s biography as a good example of utmost individual success in the teaching of the art. Schenckel’s time sees the maximum demand for teaching in the art of memory; nevertheless those are the years when the printed book has already completely won its battle. The second part regards the possibility of a survival of the book as a technological model (i.e. as a model to build applications in new technologies for knowledge communication), notwithstanding the technologies involved in its production, just as the art of memory has been recently used as a model for constructing hypermedia, and just as the book itself survived technological revolutions in past ages. The issue is discussed carefully avoiding to engage in prophecy. (shrink)